Abstract. In this paper, we propose related-key differential distinguishers based on the complementation property of Feistel ciphers. We show that with relaxed requirements on the complementation, i.e. the property does not have to hold for all keys and the complementation does not have to be on all bits, one can obtain a variety of distinguishers. We formulate criteria sufficient for attacks based on the complementation property. To stress the importance of our findings we provide analysis of the full-round primitives:
Introduction
It is a well established fact that the effective key size of DES [9] is 55 instead of 56 bits. The reduction of one bit is due to the complementation property of DES, i.e. by flipping all the bits in the key and in the plaintext, all the bits of the ciphertext will flip as well. Hence in an exhaustive key search, one has to try only half of the possible values for the key -the other complemented half would produce related ciphertexts. This property applies to all Feistel ciphers with round keys obtained as permutations of the master key bits/words, and with a round function that starts with an XOR of a single round key.
The complementation property can be seen as a simple related-key distinguisher applicable to all of the keys and detectable with a single pair of plaintexts and a corresponding pair of ciphertexts. The difference in the round keys, plaintexts and the ciphertexts is always -1, i.e. it is in all of the bits. In this paper we investigate the cases of ciphers with complementation properties applicable not necessarily to all of the keys, but only to a subset i.e. weak-key class, and with round key differences other than -1. We are aware of only one published result that analyzes the complementation property -the work of Bouillaguet et al. [3] . Even there the focus in not on the original property -the authors examine the generalizations of the complementation property, and exploit self-similarity
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of the rounds in the ciphers. Our work however targets exclusively the cases of complementation and only Feistel ciphers.
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that if instead of the requirement that the complementation property holds for all keys (as in the case of DES), we can examine only a subset of keys for which it applies. This leads to the problem of constructing a high probability differential in the key schedule of the cipher. We give the conditions on the output difference in the differential and obtain quite simple criteria for existence of related-key attacks based on the complementation property. The importance of our findings is shown on the example of two full-round Feistel ciphers: Camellia-128 [1] and GOST [5] . We analyze Camellia-128 without the non-linear layers F L, F L −1 and show how to find a pair of keys that follow the low probability differential in the key schedule constructed to exploit the complementation -this allows us to attack the hash mode of this version of the cipher. Thus we obtain the first analysis on the fullround Camellia without the F L, F L −1 in the hash mode -it requires around 2 112 encryptions. Complementation property of GOST has been known (see [7, 4] ), however all of the proposed key recovery attacks require impractical time complexity. We show that if one uses several similar complementation properties, an efficient key recovery attack on GOST exists. Our attack requires 31 relatedkey pair, and only 2 38 time and data complexities to recover the full 256-bit key. Thus we are able to perform the first experimental cryptanalysis of GOST on a computer.
Complementation Property of Feistel Constructions
The complementation property was first observed in DES. It is based on the observation that if one flips all of the bits of the master key and the plaintext, then all of the bits of the ciphertext will flip as well. The foundation of these observations for Feistel ciphers is given below. Without loss of generality we assume that the Feistel is balanced as the case for unbalanced Feistels can be examined similarly.
A balanced Feistel with r rounds is defined as:
where K n is the n-th round key, P = L 0 ||R 0 is the plaintext, and C = L r ||R r is the ciphertext. In the vast majority of Feistel ciphers, the round function F (L, K) can be decomposed as 3 :
i.e. first the round key is bitwise added to the state L, followed by some additional non-linear and linear transformations (G is usually a Substitution-Permutation network). We use the term classical Feistels for the ciphers that have such an F function. Let KS(K) be the key schedule function of the cipher, i.e. given the master key K, the function produces K i , i = 1, . . . , r round keys:
Further assume that all of the round keys K i are obtained by (possibly different) bit permutations of the master key K (as in the case of DES). If one has two related master keys
(with −1 we denote the difference in all of the bits) then the following holds for all i: The complementation property of such ciphers allows reduction of the key space by one bit as for the brute force of the whole key space it is sufficient to try only one half of all possible keys -the other half will produce a compliment ciphertext under a compliment plaintext.
The complementation property can be observed for ciphers that not necessarily have a key schedule composed of bit permutations. Notice, the only requirement on the key schedule is to produce complemented round keys.
Lemma 1 (Classical Feistel complementation).
Let for an n-bit classical Feistel cipher E K (P ) with k-bit keys and a key schedule KS(K) exist a differential with probability p for KS(K) with output difference in all of the bits in all of the round keys, i.e.
Then, if p > 2 −k , distinguisher for a weak-key class of size p · 2 k exists for the cipher E K (P ).
Proof. Once the difference in all of the round keys is -1, the complementation property can be applied, i.e. the differential in the state holds with probability 1. Therefore if the attacker can build a differential with the input difference in the master keys ∆, and output difference -1 in all of the round keys, then the differential (−1, ∆) → (−1) for the cipher E K (P ) holds with probability p. To find the right key pair that follows the differential in the key schedule one has to try around 1/p pairs of randomly chosen master keys with input difference ∆, therefore the size of this weak key class is 2 k · p. For any cipher, to produce a pair of complemented plaintexts that result in complemented ciphertexts, one has to try around 2 n pairs, however even when p < 2 −n , a false positive (i.e. a complementation pair of plaintexts-ciphertexts that indicate belonging of a key to the weak-key class) can be easily detected by trying a few more pairs of complementing plaintexts.
Remark 1
The complementation property holds regardless of the number of rounds in the cipher, by increasing the number of rounds one cannot expect to get a better resistance against this type of attacks.
Remark 2
The additional key whitenings at the beginning and at the end of the Feistel do not influence the attack complexities, but merely change the input difference in the plaintext and the output difference in the ciphertext.
The requirement of having the difference -1 in all of the round keys can be replaced with the requirement of having some difference ∆ which is not necessarily -1. We call this property a partial complementation. Also, instead of a single difference ∆ one can require two differences ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 that alternate, i.e. the first round key has ∆ 1 , the second ∆ 2 , the third ∆ 1 , etc. -this is an alternating complementation.
Lemma 2 (Classical Feistel partial alternating complementation). Let for an n-bit classical Feistel cipher E K (P ) with k-bit keys and a key schedule KS(K) exist a differential with probability p for KS(K) with alternating differences in the round keys, i.e.
Proof. We can follow the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 1 with one exception -the initial difference in the plaintext should be (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ). Then in each round, in the XOR the difference from the round key (either ∆ 1 or ∆ 2 ) would cancel the difference in the state. As they alternate with the same period of two rounds, the XOR will always produce zero difference, hence the probability of the differential in the state would be 1. Depending if the number of rounds is even or odd, the difference in the ciphertext would be either (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ) for even rounds, or (∆ 2 , ∆ 1 ) for odd rounds.
Remark 3 Lemma 2 is more general then Lemma 1, as the later is a particular case of the former for
The round function of some Feistel ciphers instead of an XOR applies modular addition of the round key, i.e. F (L, K) = G(L + K). We call this type of ciphers, modular Feistels. The (complementary) differential in the state of a modular Feistel not necessarily holds with probability 1 -the precise probability depends on the differences in the round key K i and the state word L i as well as on the number of rounds.
An efficient algorithm for computing the differential probability of modular addition was presented by Limpaa and Moriai in [8] . Our further analysis is based on this algorithm, however, due to space constraints we would not provide its description. Let (X) m be the m rightmost (least significant) bits of an n-bit word X and let |X| be the Hamming weight, i.e. the number of bits with value 1, of the word X.
Lemma 3 (Modular Feistel alternating complementation 4 ). Let for an r-round n-bit modular Feistel cipher E K (P ) with k-bit keys and a key schedule KS(K) exist a differential with probability p for KS(K) with alternating differences in the round keys, i.e.
Proof. In modular ciphers, we have to compute the probability of the differential in the state as well. As in r rounds, there are 5 r 2 round keys with ∆ 1 difference, and the same number of keys with difference ∆ 2 , it is sufficient to find only the probability of one round (with both ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 ). The differences from the incoming round key and the state word should cancel, thus avoid any incoming difference in the SP network of the round function. Hence, by Algorithm 2 of [8] , γ should be equal to zero, and the maximal probability of one round is reached when the incoming differences in the round key K i and the state word L i (or in the notation from [8] , α = β) are the same -in this case the probability of modular addition is 2 −|(∆1)n−1| or 2 −|(∆2)n−1| . Taking into account the number of rounds, one obtains the claimed probability. The second requirement in the Lemma is to ensure that the probability of the differential in the state is not bellow 2 −n . The variations of the complementation property presented above are indeed related-key differential distinguishers for ciphers. In both classical and modular Feistels, the size of the weak-key class depends only on the probability of the differential in the key schedule. However, to find and detect if a specific key belongs to the weak-key class differs between these two families, as for classical Feistels, the probability of the differential in the state is 1, whereas for modular Feistels, this probability might be lower. Hence, in the case of former one has to try around 2 P different pairs of keys and encrypt one pair of plaintexts, while in the case of modular Feistels, for each of the 2 P pairs of related-key has to encrypt 2 Q pairs of plaintexts (2 −P , 2 −Q are the probabilities of the differential in the key schedule and in the state). 4 One of our anonymous reviewers has informed us that a similar idea was used against DESX in Kelsey et al. [6] . 5 When r is odd, there are 
The Case of Camellia-128
In this section we show how to apply the complementation property (Lemma 1) to Camellia-128 [1] in the hash mode. We analyze the full-round Camellia-128 without the non-linear layers, i.e. we assume F L, F L −1 to be identity functions.
Description
Camellia is a classical Feistel cipher with a non-linear key schedule defined as follows. The 128-bit master key K L is split into two keys L, R, i.e. K L = L||R -both L and R are seen as 8-byte vectors. Further, these keys are fed to a 4-round Feistel-like transformation with an additional keys feedback after the second round (see Fig.1 ). Formally, the key schedule can be described as:
where Σ i are word constants. In the sequel, we omit the addition of the constants as they play no role in our analysis. The function F is an SP network, with the Slayer defined as application of eight 8x8 S-boxes, and P-layer is a multiplication of the eight-byte input with 8x8 byte matrix P . All the round keys K i used in the state are obtained from the two keys K L and K A with rotations on various amounts, e.g.
Complementing Camellia-128
From the description of Camellia-128 it follows that two different keys K L , K A are used, the first key being also the only input to the key schedule. Since the round keys are produced from these two keys with various rotations it follows that the differences in K L , K A have to be invariant of rotations and thus -1.
The easiest way to build such differential is by providing a differential trail, i.e. besides specifying the input and output differences, fixing as well the intermediate differences after each transformation in the key schedule. Note that from the condition on the differential it follows that ∆L 1 = ∆R 1 = ∆L 5 = ∆R 5 = −1, i.e. each byte of these words has the fixed difference −1 (or ff in the hexadecimal representation). Therefore, in the first and the fourth round of the key schedule, the number of active bytes has to be maximal, i.e. eight active bytes will enter the S-layer. It is tempting to go with a trail that has no active bytes (or one active byte) in both the second and third round, hence obtain a trail of the form (we write only the round-by-round active bytes entering the F function):
However, these types of trails are not possible due to the matrix multiplication P , i.e. P-layer. For example, if we require no active bytes in the second round, then this means the output of the F function in the first round has canceled with the -1 difference in R 1 , i.e. if we denote withã = (a 1 , . . . , a 8 ) the output difference of the S-boxes in the function F of the first round, then the above condition can be expressed as:
The solution vectorã has difference only in 4 bytes out of 8, while all the bijective S-boxes are active, i.e. we get a contradiction. Therefore, the second round of the key schedule cannot have zero active bytes. A similar situation can be observed when the second (or the third) round has only 1 active byte.
The above result suggests that the minimal number of active bytes in the key schedule is 8+2+2+8 = 20. Theoretically, this can lead to a trail with probability 2 −6·20 = 2 −120 > 2 −128 when all the active S-boxes hold with probability 2 −6 . Due to the specific input and output differences in the active S-boxes in the first and the fourth rounds, this is not achievable -the differential probability of these S-boxes is 2 −7 . Therefore if we assume the differential is composed of a single trail only, its probability would always be lower than 2 −128 . Further we try to find the actual probability of the differential taking into account all possible differential trails that compose it. All the trails can be divided into two groups: trails that have the same path (i.e. they have the same position of the active bytes, but different values for the differences), and trails that have different path.
LetS i be a possible output difference of the S-layer at round i, andF i be an output difference of the F function at round i. Note, bothS i ,F i are 8 byte
. Also, let F i be the actual output of the F function at round i. We will use S(x) to denote the S-layer, and ∆L i to denote the difference of the left state at round i, hence S(∆L i ) =S i . From the definition of the round function it holds F (∆L i ) = P · S(∆L i ) = P ·S i =F i .
ForS 1 ,S 2 ,S 3 ,S 3 the following conditions apply (see Fig.1 ):
-S 1 is produced when -1 difference in L 1 goes through the S-layer:
-S 2 is produced with an XOR ofF 1 and the difference -1 in R 1 , followed by the S-layer:S
-S 3 is produced with application of the S-layer to ∆L 3 :
Additionally, whenF 3 is XOR-ed to ∆R 3 , the output difference -1 is obtained in
-S 4 is produced when -1 difference in R 5 goes through the S-layer:
Additionally, whenF 4 is XOR-ed to ∆L 3 , the output difference -1 is obtained in
The probability of the differential can be computed as the sum of probabilities of all differential trails defined with 4 intermediate differences:
(S1,S2,S3,S4)| (8),(9),(10),(11),(12),(13) are satisfied
where |S i | denotes the number of active bytes inS i . In the following, we try to simplify the conditions and to achieve formula for computing the above probability. Note that although bothS 1 = S(−1) andS 4 = S(−1) are produced when (-1) goes through the S-layer, a randomly chosen differenceS 1 and a differenceS 4 are not necessarily the same (in fact they are different with a very high probability). To distinguish them we will use S(−1) L1 for the former and S(−1) R5 for the later.
Further we reduce the conditions on allS i to conditions only onS 2 ,S 3 . From (11) and the linearity of the matrix multiplication P it follows that
This leads to:S
Similarly, from (12) and (13) we get:
Taking into account (15), the condition (9) can be expressed as:
Let us summarize our findings. We get that forS 2 ,S 3 defined as:
two additional conditions have to hold:
InS 1 ,S 4 there are always 8 active S-boxes. The number of active S-boxes iñ S 2 ,S 3 is defined by the above conditions. As P is linear, we can compute the value of the vector P −1 (−1), i.e.
Since the S-boxes in Camellia are bijective, the vector S(−1) always has 8 active S-boxes. Therefore from (19),(20) we can conclude that the first 4 elements of S 2 ,S 3 have to be non-zero, thus the number of active S-boxes in round 2 and 3 is at least 4 (the first 4 bytes must be active). Additionally, regarding the number and position of the active S-boxes, since there are always at least 4 active Sboxes inS 2 andS 3 , the conditions (21),(22) can always be satisfied (the branch number of P is 4). 
Recall that a differential is a collection of trails that take the same path (have the same position of the active bytes) and trails that take different path. We group all trails that take the same path into one single truncated trail. Then a differential is a collection of truncated trails and hence its probability is the sum of probabilities of the truncated trails. To define a truncated trail we just have to fix the position of the actives S-boxes in the four rounds of the key schedule. With T i we denote the truncated difference entering the round function of round i. Then a truncated trail can be defined as T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 . An actual trail withS 1 , . . . ,S 4 belongs to a truncated trail if the position of the active S-boxes in S i coincide with the position of the active S-boxes in T i . Obviously
as all the S-boxes in the first and the fourth round are active. For the probability of the differential we get: (20), (21), (22) } (25) Hence, to find the probability of the differential, we only have to count the number of possible differential trails (that satisfy a set of conditions) in all possible truncated trails T 2 , T 3 of the form (1, 1, 1, 1, x 5 , x 6 , x 7 , x 8 ), x i ∈ {0, 1}. To proceed further we define the notion of compliance.
This notion is introduced to check if some input difference ∆ 1 at function f (x) can produce output difference ∆ 2 .
Observation 1 Two randomly chosen differences ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 comply through the S-boxes of Camellia with probability 127 255 ≈ 2 −1 .
Every input difference to the S-box can go to 127 output differences or approximately to 2 7 out of 2 8 − 1 possible, which is around 2 −1 . As an example, let us compute the number of possible trails for the case when T 2 , T 3 have all 8 active bytes. From the properties of the S-boxes used in Camellia we have that each input byte difference (including the difference ff) can go to 127 or approximately 6 2 7 distinct output differences. Since we have 6 We can approximate with 2 7 as one of the output differences happens twice, which means that although we increase the number from 127 to 128, on the other hand we decrease the probability for this difference from 2 −6 to 2 −7 , hence the two rounding errors compensate one another. This fact can easily be checked if one takes instead of bytes, 7-bit nibbles. Then the maximal differential probability of 7x7 S-box can be 2 6 .
8 active input bytes in S(−1) L1 and in S(−1) R5 , there are in total 2 7·8 = 2 56 differences forS 2 andS 3 (see the definitions (19), (20)). AsS 2 has 8 active bytes, the following condition has to hold:
where all d i are non-zero. Hence, out of all 2 56 this condition satisfy 2 56 · (1 − 127 −4 ) ≈ 2 56 differences, or approximately all. A similar conclusion can be obtained regarding (20) . Now let us focus on (21),(22). The probability thatS 2 comply withS 3 from (21) can be computed as:
1. the probability that P ·S 3 is 8 byte difference -it is approximately 1. In the general case, whenS 2 has i active bytes, the probability is approximately 2 −8·(8−i) . 2. the probability that each of the differences in 8 bytes ofS 2 and P ·S 3 comply. This is 2 −8 , while in the general case it is 2 −i for differences in i bytes.
Therefore, for a randomly chosen differences the probability of (21) is 2 −8 . A similar reasoning can be applied to (22). Hence, out of all possibleS 2 ,S 3 there are 2 56 · 2 56 · 2 −8 · 2 −8 = 2 96 differences that satisfy all four conditions. Therefore, for T 2 = T 3 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) , the probability of the differential is at least:
If we take into account all possible T 2 , T 3 for the probability of the differential we get:
Thus, by Lemma 1, the size of the weak key class is 2 128 · 2 −128 = 1. For this key K, the complementation property holds, i.e. KS(K ⊕ (−1)) ⊕ KS(K) = −1, and taking into account the whitening keys, we get that for any plaintext P , it holds
Note that the size of the weak key class is too small for any attack on the cipher, however it is sufficient for an attack on the hash function mode of the cipher. As a compression function, we can choose the standard Davies-Meyer compression mode:
Let K be the key value for which the (−1, −1) → (−1, −1) differential in the key schedule holds. For the compression function we get that for any H the following holds:
Therefore if we can find the correct key K (which is indeed the correct message M , as M = K in the hash mode), we can produce collisions for the compression function of Camellia. Note, as H can be arbitrary, this leads to collisions for the whole hash function. To find the exact value of the key K we use the conditions (19)-(22) combined into the algorithm:
1. Create a setS of all possible differences P −1 (−1) ⊕ S(−1) -the size of the set is 2 56 2. Create a set S R of pairs of differences (δ 2 , δ 3 ), δ 2 , δ 3 ∈S such that δ 2 complies with P · δ 3 and δ 3 complies with P · δ 2 -the size of this set is 2 96 3. Choose a random pair (δ 2 , δ 3 ) from S R 4. Produce the value of L 1 (and the corresponding F 1 ) that converts -1 into the
. As δ 3 has 8 active S-boxes, and for each active S-box there are 2 different values (A and A ⊕ (−1)), for a fixed δ 3 there are 2
8 possible values of (L 1 , F 1 ) 5. Produce similarly the values of (L 4 , F 4 ) from δ 2 6. Produce
The probability of steps 6,7 is 2 −56 each and there are 2 2(48+8) possible (L 1 , F 1 ) and (L 4 , F 4 ). Hence, after repeating step three 2 96 times and steps four-five 2 112 times, one key candidate will be produced. Thus the complexity of the algorithm is 2 112 . Note that with an effort of 2 112 we can produce one collision for the compression function of Camellia-128 (without F L, F L −1 ). Once we have the correct message M , we can produce collision for any input chaining value. This means that for any messages M 1 , M 3 (the M 3 block is used as message padding), we can produce a collision for the hash function of Camellia-128 . The colliding pairs are (M 1 ||M ⊕ (−1)||M 3 ) and (M 1 ||M ||M 3 ). Therefore, to produce q collisions with the same fixed difference between the message words (the difference is (0|| − 1||0) we need 2 112 calls to the hash function 7 . On the other hand, for the generic case, producing such collisions (they are indeed called differential q multicollisions, see [2] ), one needs around q2 
The Case of GOST
In this section we show how the partial complementation property (Lemma 3) of GOST can be used to launch a practical related-key recovery attack on the full-round cipher. We note that the mentioned below complementation properties have been known and exploited in attacks on GOST [7, 4] . However, to the best of our knowledge, all the attacks on GOST that recover the full key, are impractical.
Description of GOST
GOST is a modular 32-round Feistel cipher with 256-bit key. The key schedule of GOST is trivial. The master key K is divided into eight 32-bit words K i , i = 1, . . . , 8 and in each of the four groups of 8 rounds, the round keys RK j , j = 1, . . . , 32 are permutation of the key words K i , i.e. 
Complementing GOST
As GOST is a modular Feistel, Lemma 3 can be applied to this cipher. The round keys do not allow the choice of different alternating ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 as each of the key words K i is used in both even and odd rounds. For example, K 1 is used in rounds 1, 9, 17, and 32. Therefore, one has to choose ∆ 1 = ∆ 2 = ∆, i.e. all of the keys K i have the same difference ∆. The differential in the key schedule holds with probability p = 1. To maximize the probability of the differential in the state, one has to choose ∆ = 2 31 -in this case the size of the class is 2 256 , i.e. the complementation is applicable to all of the keys.
One can maintain the same size of the weak-key class (all keys), but reduce the probability of the differential in the state. For example, when ∆ 1 = ∆ 2 = ∆ = 2 i , i = 0, . . . , 30, then the partial complementation property is still applicable to all keys, but detecting this property requires more data, i.e. instead of the previous one pair of plaintexts and ciphertexts, by Lemma 3 now one needs 1/2 −16(1+1) = 2 32 pairs. This weakens the distinguisher, but allows key recovery attacks. Let ∆ = 2 m , m < 31. If in some round i, one knows the value of the state S that is modularly added to the the round key RK i (in the state/key pair, the m-th bit has the difference 1), then under the assumption that the differences have canceled, one can find the exact value RK m i of the m-bit of the round key RK i , i.e. if S is known, and
then the value RK m i of the m-th bit of RK i can be computed as:
It is trivial to check that only under such values of RK m i and S m the differences would cancel. For m = 31, i.e. when the difference is in the most significant bit, then the cancellation always occurs, hence one cannot find the exact value of the most significant bit with this approach.
The above single-bit recovery can be applied sequentially to all the bits of the round key RK i , thus the whole RK i can be recovered. Once the i-th round key is known, one can compute the state of the cipher in the next round and thus repeat the same process but for the round key RK i+1 . Hence this domino effect allows to recover all of the round keys resulting in a full key recovery of the master key. The attack presented below is a related-key attack with 31 relatedkey pairs. For the secret master key K with the key words (a) For each k, k = 0, . . . , 30, the k-bit of K r can be recovered from the knowledge of incoming state. In the first round, the value of the state is known, i.e. P states for the next round -this can be performed as one knows both the state and the round key.
The encryption of the initial 2 32 pairs of plaintexts for each i, guarantees that with a high probability one can find a pair of ciphertexts with the same difference -hence this pair follows the differential in the state. For each round, one has to guess only a single bit (the most significant bit) of the round key, thus step 3 has to be repeated at most 2 8 times. Therefore the time complexity of the full key-recovery attack is 2 · (31 · 2 32 + 2 8 ) ≈ 2 38 encryptions and a similar data complexity of 2 38 chosen plaintexts. The low complexities allow to perform an experimental cryptanalysis of GOST on a computer. We have followed the attack algorithm described above and were able to verify our approach by recovering the full 256-bit key -our unoptimized implementation ran for one day on a single Intel i5 core. As the key recovery can be parallelized, another implementation was able to recover the full key in around 7 hours using four Intel i5 cores.
Conclusion
We have shown a potential vulnerability in Feistel ciphers based on the complementation property that results in relatively easily detectable related-key differential attacks. Two such attacks on full-round Feistel primitives, the hash mode of Camellia-128 without F L, F L −1 , and the block cipher GOST, have been presented in this paper.
We have deduced a simple criteria for cryptanalysis of classical Feistel ciphers: if for the key schedule there exists a high probability differential that produces alternating differences in the round keys then the cipher is vulnerable to relatedkey attacks, regardless of the number of rounds in the state. Moreover, from the analysis of Camellia-128 without F L, F L −1 , one can conclude that even if such differential has a low probability, but a pair of keys following the differential could be found, the hash mode of the cipher is still vulnerable.
The Feistel ciphers that use modular addition of the round keys in the state are less susceptible to this type of attacks as the data required to detect the complementation property depends on the number of rounds as well. However, from the analysis of GOST one can see that, when the alternating differences in the round keys have a low Hamming weight, such ciphers are potential targets of complementation weaknesses as well. Our related-key attack on GOST was confirmed experimentally.
We believe that our attacks based on the complementation property might be launched on several other existing Feistel primitives, i.e. this paper does not exhaust the possible targets. Thus the approach presented here can be seen as simple tool for cryptanalysis of current Feistel primitives, but also an important security threat that should be taken into account when designing new primitives based on Feistel.
